individual meetings (e.g., Ludlow , 2004 . These offer refreshing perspectives on the European Council and useful chronologies of negotiations, but do not qualify as theory-driven research.
This paper explores the sources of bargaining power in the European Council. What resources grant national executives influence in summit negotiations? Why are some heads of government more influential than others? Ultimately, it is question of explaining the outcomes of European Council negotiations. The paper moves beyond existing research in three central respects. First, it addresses negotiation dynamics inside the European Council, which so far have not been subject to systematic research. Second, it draws explicitly on general theories of negotiation and decision-making in isolating, explicating, and categorizing alternative sources of bargaining power. Third, it synthesizes and presents a unique set of elite testimonies on bargaining power in the European Council.
Prevailing conceptions of power in the European Council are often either overly legalistic or prone to simplistic power distinctions. Formally speaking, all heads of state and government enjoy equal status in the European Council as a product of the principle of unanimity. The executives of Luxembourg and Malta have the same right to veto proposals as the executives of Germany and France. However, even cursory knowledge of European affairs suggests that formal authority is one thing, and influence over political outcomes
another. Yet, when the legalistic perspective is surrendered for power-sensitive interpretations, these tend to present general claims about differences between large and small member states, without specifying how differences in size matter, and without recognizing alternative sources of bargaining power. As Andrew Moravcsik notes: "Intergovernmental explanations often speak of Germany, France, or Britain as 'powerful' or 'influential' in negotiations, but such claims are rarely demonstrated by specifying what resources convey 'power' or which outcomes demonstrate that one country has been influential" (1998, 53) .
The general argument of this paper is that bargaining power in the European Council can be captured in three dimensions: state sources of power, institutional sources of power, and individual sources of power. Bargaining power is defined here as the capacity of the national executive to achieve a distributional outcome that as closely as possible reflects the preferences of the member state he or she represents. The first dimension of bargaining power is the most fundamental. On most issues, differences between the member states in structural power resources -economic strength, population size, military capabilities, political stability, and administrative capacity -decisively shape bargaining outcomes. Yet differences in state sources of power do not provide the full picture. The dominance of Europe's resourceful states is mediated, and sometimes even offset, by the other two dimensions of bargaining power. Institutional features of the European Council -the access to the veto and the rotating Presidency -constitute additional sources of bargaining power, as do the personal qualities of the chief executives as negotiators -their personal authority and their level of expertise.
Coalition-building, in this context, is conceived of as a strategy for pooling bargaining power, rather than an independent source of power itself.
The paper reports the results of a project specifically designed to overcome the problems associated with previous research on the European Council. The core strategy is an ambitious and unique series of elite interviews with acting or former presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers, as well as top-level officials of member states and EU institutions. 1 The list of interviewees includes thirteen heads of state or government and ministers of foreign affairs, most of which have held office in the period from the mid-1990 and onwards. In principle, the interviewees appeared on record, but were granted anonymity where this was specifically requested, often because of relations to third countries.
While offering unique empirical insights, elite interviewing is associated with risks that should be acknowledged and preferably minimized. Skewed samples may affect the conclusions from the interview material. Retired politicians or civil servants may suffer from a selective and self-aggrandizing memory. Active politicians and civil servants may be tempted to tailor their answers to suit specific political objectives. I pursue a fourfold strategy for dealing with these problems and minimizing the risk of biases in the conclusions. First, interviewees have been selected to control for known political divides in EU politics, notably left-right, large-small, north-south, and intergovernmentalist-federalist. Second, I have asked principled questions about experiences of bargaining power in the European Council, rather than questions about specific historical events. Third, I have centered on general tendencies in the interview material, based on multiple interviews, and I only draw on individual interviews when exemplifying general tendencies through quotes. Fourth, I report suspected biases, such as when interviewees speak in their own favor.
I lay out the argument in three sections. The first section explains how bargaining power may be derived from a member state's aggregate structural power, as well as from its issue-specific power. In the second section, I specify how the institutional context of European Council negotiations generates additional sources of bargaining power. The third section specifies individual attributes that heads of government may profit from to varying degrees. The paper ends with a conclusion that outlines the implications of this argument for research on EU politics and international bargaining generally.
State sources of power
Heads of government in the European Council represent a diverse set of member states. How and to what extent do differences between member states affect the bargaining power of their national executives, in negotiations with other heads of government in the European Council?
Drawing on the international relations (IR) literature on state power, I distinguish in this section between a member state's aggregate structural power and its issue-specific power, where the first refers to the overall capabilities of a state and the latter to its resources in a particular policy area. The testimonies from European Council participants suggest that both forms of state power loom large in summit bargaining. Despite the fact that cooperation in the EU is more institutionalized than in any other international organization, and takes place between a relatively homogenous group of industrialized democracies, differences in state capabilities and resources are perceived to matter greatly.
Aggregate structural power
Aggregate structural power refers to a state's total amount of resources and capabilitie -its territory, population, economic strength, military capabilities, technological development, political stability, and administrative capacity. The notion that a state's power is a reflection of its aggregate resources harks back to the age of great power conflict in Europe, but it also features in the modern analysis of world politics, where it constitutes a key component of realist theory (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979) . State capabilities, in this view, determine national power, which in turn determines the position of a state in relation to other states in the international system. The emphasis on aggregate resources signals the central assumption that capabilities can be added up, are measureable, and in theory can be calculated into a national power score.
When applied to the analysis of international negotiations, this perspective suggests that states of greater aggregate structural power will prevail, since they can use their superior resources to coax and cajole weaker parties into submission through threats and promises (Hampson with Hart 1995, 8-11; Hopmann 1998, 99-111 Spain is trying to replace Italy, but it is not successful, and Poland will have to admit that it is not part of these great member states, although being Poland."
Yet how, exactly, do differences in aggregate structural power impact on European Council negotiations? In the age of great power rivalry, aggregate structural resources allowed the strong to back up negotiation demands with threats of military aggression or economic isolation. In Europe of today, gun-boat diplomacy is not an option and aggregate structural power affects negotiations in considerably more subtle ways. The interviews suggest that resources and capabilities rarely are actively deployed in the bargaining process. Rather, asymmetries in aggregate structural power matter indirectly, by affecting a state's range of alternatives, the resources it can commit to an issue, the legitimacy of its claims to influence.
A large home market makes a state more influential in internal market negotiations, military capabilities enable a state to exercise leadership in the EU's foreign and security policy, and population size grants voice in an EU claiming to be a democratic community.
According Whereas the dominant expectation before the eastern enlargement was that the large member states would suffer in influence, because of the accession of twelve small or mediumsized countries, the testimonies of European Council participants suggest otherwise.
Paradoxically, the dominance of the large member states may instead have been reinforced, as issues that previously were settled in the formal plenary sessions increasingly are resolved in informal and minilateral negotiations, managed by the Presidency and with participation by those parties most essential for reaching an agreement that subsequently can be extended to the broader membership. In practice, those parties have tended to be the EU's large member states, sometimes joined by small or medium-sized states with particular stakes in the issue. remainder of this paper will be devoted to these other dimensions of bargaining power, of which the first is a more specified interpretation of when, where, and how differences in state properties matter.
Issue-specific power
The notion of issue-specific power has developed into the favored explanation in modern negotiation analysis for patterns of bargaining success that diverge from those predicted by the distribution of aggregate resources. According to this line of argument, resources and capabilities may not be deployed with equal effectiveness in all issues and relationships.
Rather, it is the power balance in the issue-specific relationship that determines bargaining outcomes (even if aggregate resources may shape the issue-specific power balance). This helps to explain paradoxes of power in international negotiation, such as when structurally disadvantaged states nevertheless prevail in negotiations with structurally advantaged states, owing to superior issue-specific power (Odell 1980; Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Habeeb 1988 ).
Issue-specific power is defined by a state's resources in a particular issue, its commitment to this issue, and its alternatives to a negotiated agreement on this issue. The issue-specific nature of resources entails that a state's bargaining power in economic affairs, for instance, will not be decided by its military capability, territory, or population, but by its market power and GDP (Habeeb 1988 European Council participants testify that issue-specific aspects of power are prominent in negotiations. The relative weight of the member states shifts depending on the issue, as a product of the resources they can deploy, national commitments to particular causes, and the attractiveness of the status quo. However, it should be noted that the empirical establishment of such power is made difficult by overlaps between issue-specific and aggregate structural power, giving rise to observational equivalence. For instance, it is difficult to determine whether the influence of German, French, and British executives in negotiations on the internal market or the EU's long-term budget is a product of these countries' superior economic strength alone or their general advantages in terms of aggregate structural power. Still, it is possible to isolate a number of expressions of issue-specific power Council on issues of foreign and security policy is not on par with that of France and the UK.
Another often mentioned example is Italy's loss of bargaining power on economic issues, despite a sizeable GDP, because of long-running budget deficits and a growing government debt.
A second expression of issue-specific power noted by European Council participants is the tendency of small or medium-sized states to "punch above their weight" -to exercise more power on specific issues than a mere assessment of their aggregate structural resources would lead us to expect. Small and medium-sized states with specific regional interests often succeed in shaping the EU's policy toward these areas, owing to extensive experience in dealing with the region, as well as great commitment to the development of EU policy vis-à-vis the region. Prominent examples are the engagement of Belgium in Central Africa, the Netherlands in Indonesia, Spain in the Mediterranean, and the Nordics in the Baltic. European
Council participants further testify to specific small-state influence on issues where these countries present strong ambitions, extensive knowledge, and national policies that may be exported to the European level, for instance, the Nordic states on employment policy and environmental policy. Finally, the combination of a strong commitment and an attractive status quo alternative has strengthened the hand of certain small or medium-sized member states on specific dossiers, for instance, Greece on issues relating to Turkey and Luxembourg on issues pertaining to financial services. Studies of international negotiations find that veto provisions strengthen the bargaining position of parties or coalitions that do not enjoy structural power, and constitute one of the principal sources of influence for weak states in competition with the strong (Zartman 1971; Habeeb 1988; Hampston with Hart 1995, 32) . Furthermore, existing research establishes that unanimity tends to generate processes of consensual decision-making, where recalcitrant parties are bought off through side-payments and favors are exchanged through package deals. The states expected to benefit the most from unanimity as decision principle are therefore those most pleased with the status quo, that is, those who would lose the least if an agreement could not be found (Scharpf 1997; Meunier 2000; Moravcsik 1998 ).
Institutional sources of power
European Council participants testify that the actual wielding of the veto is a relatively rare occurrence in summit negotiations, but very effective when used. When national executives walk into the European Council, they know they will have to agree, and if a state has strong objections on an issue, it will often prevail. As Erkki Tuomioja, former If a prime minister, sitting with his colleagues, is threatening with a veto time after time, he loses all kinds of influence. It is seen as a sign of weakness, because if you give the impression that you do not have free hands at home, you cannot really develop an influence in the European Council. But, if from time to time, you step away from a well-known national position, saying 'OK, I will take it, but I will have great difficulties at home,' then you gradually build up a kind of aura that this is not only about words and lip-service, but that you are willing to undergo some difficulties at home.
Finally, the veto does not put an end to the political process. Conflicts must be solved and proposals adopted. As Finland's president, Tarja Halonen, underlines: "[The veto may be used] when you really need it and you have a plan what to do after that. Because saying no, you do not stop the process. You just take a time-out."
European Council participants testify that the veto is used more frequently on some issues than on others, and more effectively by some member states than by others. As regards issues, they specifically point to negotiations on the EU's long-term budgets and to bargaining over treaty reform. These are issues with such general political and economic implications that they bring vital national interests to the fore and legitimate the wielding of the veto. As regards member states, they frequently mention Spain as a country whose representatives have been very skillful in exploiting the power of the veto, especially in negotiations over the EU's long-term budgets. As one chief executive states: "Spain is very good at having results.
[They achieve results by] being tough, being very tough. They are not impossible -you always know that there is a price to buy them. You can be impossible, so that the others know that you will say forever no.
[But] if you negotiate a good result, [the Spanish] will say yes." Furthermore, differences in structural power are perceived to affect the legitimacy of wielding the veto. According to one prime minister, it is a simple reality of politics that "Luxembourg can issue a veto once in a decade, and Britain once per week." By the same token, the veto of large member states is perceived to carry more weight than that of the small or medium-sized, tendency to pre-program forthcoming meetings in order to achieve greater policy continuity.
In addition, the European Council generally devotes part of its meetings to EU or international matters that require the attention of the heads of government. Yet, even with these constraints, the Presidency can affect the agenda and the outcome of meetings by contributing its own pet issues to the agenda, attributing varying weight to the items on the agenda, and keeping certain issues away from the agenda. It is frequently emphasized by European Council participants that the greatest influence over the agenda is exerted in the preparatory phase, when the Presidency structures and delimits the agenda, rather than in the meetings per se.
Sweden's Göran Persson offers the following reflection:
As the chairman of a meeting, you are controlling the agenda. It is those who realize the potential to set the agenda that affect the development [of EU policy]. Then you need not dominate the meeting, but it is the issues that you yourself have put up on the agenda that are discussed. If you do not control the agenda as chairman -and there have been such Presidencies -then nothing will come of it. It has to be prepared, and this is a truth that applies to local associations and the European Council alike. If you are to have any chance of governing the meeting, then you must decide the contents of the agenda.
Since several issues that require the European Council's attention are "hard cases,"
where the member states have been unable to reach agreement at lower levels, brokerage 
Personal authority
The importance of individual personality traits, experiences, and authority is an issue that has received extensive attention in the study of international negotiations and foreign policy decision-making. One line of inquiry specifically addresses how the cognitive structures of leaders affect behavior in bargaining (Jönsson 1990) , whereas another strand of analysis explores the influence of leadership style on foreign policy decision-making (e.g., Hermann et et al. 2001) . The influential notion of negotiations as two-level games, involving both domestic and international bargaining, generates the expectation that heads of government will enjoy a certain level of autonomy, to the effect that personalities and personal preferences may impact on negotiation outcomes (Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993) .
Finally, students of international negotiation propose that specific individuals may succeed in shaping how other participants perceive of problems and solutions through ideas and visions, as well as through authority and trust earned in previous interaction (Young 1991; Risse 2000) .
The importance of personal relations and personal authority is a recurring theme in the participants' own assessments of influence in the European Council. In particular, they underline the differences between individuals in terms of personal respect and trust, which are seen as attributes to be won and earned, rather than given by birth or appointment. One implication is that seniority in the club and earlier performance are perceived to matter. As
Philippe Schoutheete (2006, 46) , long-serving EU ambassador of Belgium, testifies: "Because participants are relatively few in number and personal relations important, the balance of power in the European Council is influenced by seniority. Newcomers will not be able to pull their full weight at first meetings. Heads of government of smaller member states can expect to exert more influence after several years of being present, particularly after they led a successful presidency." Schröder, by contrast, is portrayed as surprisingly silent, without an interest in the political game, often detached from the debate, and therefore dependent on others' automatic respect for German interests, even if he was listened to on those occasions when he spoke up. Blair's influence is typically seen as less extensive than his spin-doctors make it seem, and with the important exceptions of the Lisbon process and transatlantic issues, "he is not really in the game, although destroying the games of others." Berlusconi is consistently portrayed as a maverick leader with a limited interest in EU issues, irratic negotiation behavior, and a selfassumed role as the comedian of the club. Juncker, finally, is described as the head of government who by himself commands the greatest respect and authority, because of his long time in the European Council, his extreme experience and competence, his capacity to put European interests before national (of which there are few), and his networking abilities and close relationship with especially German and French leaders. As one head of government put it: "How many times do you need to multiply Juncker's weight because of his personal and human attributes? Juncker probably weighs more than countries with twelve to fourteen million inhabitants."
Expertise
The advantages of possessing expertise and information in bargaining are widely acknowledged. Multilateral negotiations are characterized by high levels of complexity and uncertainty, because of the large number of parties, proposals, and preferences (Winham 1977; Zartman 1994; Hampson with Hart 1995) . As a result, negotiators seldom have perfect knowledge of the many technical issues on the agenda, the legal procedures available, and the preferences of other actors. However, some may be better informed than others, and those parties that possess superior expertise are also better positioned to identify potential agreements and shape outcomes in their own favor (Young 1991; Tallberg 2006) . It is common in the literature to distinguish between three alternative forms of expertise: content expertise, process expertise, and preference information (Wall and Lynn 1993; Beach 2005 knowing what the position is, and understanding why this particular position is taken.
According to European Council participants, there is sometimes a lack of understanding of the domestic political debate in other member states that renders it difficult to arrive at compromise agreements acceptable to all parties. As one experienced prime minister concludes: "The real problem of the European Council is that the majority of the members…do not have the time or do not take the time to be totally informed in a way that, leaving behind their national interests, they can develop compromise formulas. ---What people say is seldom unreasonable, it is simply political."
Conclusion
The central message of this paper is that bargaining power in the European Council is polymorphic. Testimonies from a broad sample of European Council participants strongly suggest that bargaining power in this forum cannot be reduced to either a matter of formal equality or a question of great power dominance. Rather, the relative power of national executives is a product of the structural capabilities of the member states they represent, their access to institutional resources in the European Council, and their own personal qualities as
negotiators. Yet not all forms of bargaining power are equally prominent in shaping negotiation outcomes. European Council participants testify that differences in structural power are most fundamental, with the effect that France, Germany, and the UK most often set the parameters of summit negotiations. Even if structural capabilities rarely are deployed directly in the negotiation process, they impact indirectly, by defining a state's range of options, the resources it can commit to an issue, and the legitimacy of its claim to shape joint decisions. The institutional and individual dimensions of power tend to be of secondary importance and mainly mediate the impact of structural power asymmetry. These results suggest that the European Council offers greater lee-way for power politics than any other EU institution. Whereas the impact of structural power differentials in the EU's general legislative process is softened by the involvement of the supranational institutions, the European Council offers more limited institutional protection to small and medium-sized member states.
Somewhat paradoxically, the enlargement of the EU appears to have strengthened these qualities of the European Council, by moving negotiations away from the plenary meetings of the summits and into informal and minilateral sessions dominated by the large member states.
This paper does not offer the final word on bargaining power in the European
Council. Rather, it constitutes a first step toward a more advanced understanding of bargaining in the European Council, laying the ground for future research by identifying and explicating multiple sources of power in summit negotiations. Yet, even with this more limited ambition, the paper speaks to prominent lacunae in research on EU politics and international negotiation.
First, it opens up a new area of research on the politics of summitry, in the EU and elsewhere. Existing literature on the European Council is typically atheoretical, refraining from integrating insights from the general political science literature on negotiation and decision-making. Furthermore, it tends to be heavily centered on the historical evolution of the European Council and its contribution to European integration, and silent on the issue of bargaining dynamics within. This paper demonstrates that general negotiation theory is a highly effective instrument for untangling alternative sources of power in the European Council. Moreover, it contributes to advancing the research on summitry politics in generala subject that so far has received exceedingly limited attention (for a rare contribution, see Putnam and Bayne 1987) .
Second, the paper points to the limits of presenting dominant IR theories as competing explanations of state influence in international cooperation. Rather, this inventory of bargaining power in the European Council underlines the complementarity of resources privileged by alternative theories of power in international relations: the importance of structural power (realism), the power of the veto (rational choice institutionalism), and the power of persuasion (constructivism).
Third and finally, the paper engages in the kind of analytical groundwork that is called for in the IR literature on power. As David Baldwin (2002, 186) 
